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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Constitution famously begins with the words “We the People,”1 but fails throughout 
its 4,400 words
2
 to define who comprises “the People” of the United States of America.3  The 
term appears throughout the Constitution’s clauses—notably repeated five times within the Bill 
of Rights alone
4—yet for years the meaning of this elusive phrase has confounded courts and 
scholars alike.
5
  
Multiple schools of thought have emerged on the subject.
6
 The first holds the meaning of 
“the People” in the Constitution to be wholly inclusive—encompassing all those subject to the 
laws of the United States.
7
 Another interpretation finds “only those with political rights—e.g., 
voting, public office” to fit within the definition of “the People.”8 Conversely, yet another 
approach finds that the term has different meanings within different clauses.
9
 While each of these 
interpretations has merit, none focuses primarily on the question at hand—whether minors are 
included in “the People” afforded informational privacy rights under the constitution. 
                                                        
1
 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
2
 Fascinating Facts about the U.S. Constitution, https://www.constitutionfacts.com/us-constitution-
amendments/fascinating-facts/. 
3
 See Note, The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution,126 HARV. L. REV. 1078, 1085 (2013) (“The phrase 
“the people” is not defined in the Constitution, nor is its meaning clear on its face. It might refer to citizens, or to all 
citizens and some noncitizens (such as those persons with substantial connections), or to everyone in the United 
States. Each of these interpretations has received at least some support from courts or individual Justices. In the 
infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford decision, Chief Justice Taney wrote that “[t]he words ‘people of the United States' 
and ‘citizens' are synonymous.” In Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that “the people” encompassed 
citizens and those noncitizens with substantial connections to this country. In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that 
everyone in the United States and subject to its laws should receive constitutional protections. Thus, while several 
interpretations are possible, the Court has not clearly embraced one, so this analysis turns to other accepted 
interpretive principles to inform the meaning--or the meanings--of “the people.”). 
4
 See id. at 1078; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 1; id. amends. I, II, IV, IX, X, XVII. 
5
 See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 1079; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
6
 See Note, supra note 3, at 1089. 
7
 See id. at 1078. 
8
 See id. at 1078. 
9
 See id. at 1079 (“These amendments' texts, origins, precedents, and purposes suggest that the same phrase, “the 
people,” can have different meanings in different clauses.”). 
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The Constitution grants numerous rights to the people—some explicitly via the language 
of the text,
10
 and others implicitly understood as the result of painstaking scholarly and judicial 
interpretation.
11
 As a result, certain fundamental rights and constitutionally protected liberty 
interests exist.
12
 In some instances, these rights have been held to apply, at least in part, to 
minors.
13
 In other cases, the Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the Constitution does not 
afford such rights to minors.
14
 Finally, there remains uncertainty with regard to certain rights and 
constitutionally protected liberty interests—on these the Supreme Court has yet to speak.15 
Among the uncertain is the right to privacy.
16
 This implicit right contains within it what has been 
termed “informational privacy” —that is, the right to control information about oneself.17 The 
Supreme Court has only been tasked with issues related to informational privacy three times, and 
none of these issues dealt with the application of such a right to minors.
18
 However, lower courts 
have grappled with the issue numerous times, unsurprisingly reaching different conclusions.
19
 
The result is a murky body of law containing ill-defined parameters and varying applications of 
the right to informational privacy to minors. 
While some guidance can be gleaned from the Court’s application of other fundamental 
rights to minors,
20
 informational privacy—especially in the age of technology—is a unique and 
novel element of the implicit right to privacy that poses it’s own distinctive challenges. One such 
                                                        
10
 See Stephen M. Durdena, Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections Are More Equal Than 
Others, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 337, 346-49 (2008) (discussing plain language Textualism). 
11
 See Caleb Hall, A Right Most Dear: The Case for a Constitutional Environmental Right, 30 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 85, 
92-93 (2016) (discussing how certain rights “must be implied because the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly 
guarantee such a right”).  
12
 See Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 101 (2002). 
13
 See infra Part II. 
14
 See infra Part II. 
15
 See infra Part II. 
16
 See infra Section I.A. 
17
 See infra Section II.D. 
18
 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); 
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011). 
19
 See infra Section III.A. 
20
 See infra Part II. 
 4 
challenge lies with the application of informational privacy. Though some scholars have argued 
in favor of a minor’s full right to informational privacy in the context of sexual information and 
other physical health care related information,
21
 and others have argued for the full expansion of 
the right to informational privacy to minors, regardless of context,
22
 this Note focuses on the 
access to the mental health care records of minors. Much like informational privacy is a subset of 
the right to privacy as a whole, and given it’s own unique treatment by the Court, the varied and 
unique information protected under this right is deserving of differing treatment. 
Mental health care is particularly relevant in today’s climate. Suicide is the third leading 
cause of death for ten- to fourteen-year olds and the second leading cause of death for fifteen to 
thirty-four-year-olds,”23 and it is estimated that over 90% of teens that commit suicide suffer 
from mental health issues.
24
 After experiencing a decline in the 80’s and 90’s,25 suicide rates 
have recently skyrocketed.
26
 A 2013 poll of students in grades nine through twelve revealed the 
following: (1) 17% of students “seriously considered attempting suicide” (2) 13.6% of students 
planned an attempt at suicide, (3) and 8 % of students actually attempted suicide.
27
 
                                                        
21
 See Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159 (2015); See also Planned Parenthood of 
Indiana v. Carter, 854 N.E.2d 853 (Ind. App. 2006). 
22
 See Jonathan O. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representation—The Proper Roles of Children, Parents, and 
Attorneys, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 423, 431-33 (1993) (discussing the “‘children's rights movement’ 
of the 1970s”). 
23
 SUICIDE AT A GLACE, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicide-datasheet-a.pdf. 
24
 Teen Suicide Statistics, HEALTHYCHILDREN.ORG, https://www.healthychildren.org/English/health-
issues/conditions/emotional-problems/Pages/Teen-Suicide-Statistics.aspx (last visited March 10, 2017) (“Studies 
show that at least 90% of teens who kill themselves have some type of mental health problem, such as depression, 
anxiety, drug or alcohol abuse, or a behavior problem.”). 
25
 See Rae Ellen Bichell, Suicide Rates Climb In U.S., Especially Among Adolescent Girls, NPR (April 22, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/04/22/474888854/suicide-rates-climb-in-u-s-especially-among-
adolescent-girls (“In the '80s and '90s, America's suicide trend was headed in the right direction: down.”). 
26
 See id. (“The suicide rate has risen by a quarter, to 13 per 100,000 people in 2014 from 10.5 in 1999, according to 
an analysis by Curtin [a statistician with the National Center for Health Statistics] and her colleagues that was 
released Friday.”). Particularly troubling are the statistics for girls aged ten to fourteen. See id. This group has tripled 
its rate of suicide in recent years. See id. 
27
 SUICIDE AT A GLACE, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicide-datasheet-a.pdf. 
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This dramatic and troubling trend can be attributed, at least in part, to the stigma 
surrounding mental health issues.
28
 Teens are afraid of the social backlash from seeking mental 
health care and thus opt to avoid treatment altogether for fear that, if they do, they will have no 
right to keep that care private.
29
 Therefore, there is a pressing need to afford the mental health 
records of minors unique treatment—the full privacy protections available under the 
Constitution—under which infringements are subject to the highest level of judicial scrutiny and 
minors are placed on equal constitutional footing as their adult counterparts.
30
  
Part I of this Note discusses the history of Constitutional interpretation as applied to the 
right to privacy, and, whether the right extends to informational privacy.
31
 This Part further 
explores the standards applied by courts tasked with reviewing cases involving such rights.
32
 Part 
II details the history and evolution of the Constitutional rights afforded to minors, the limitations 
placed thereon, and the levels of scrutiny applied by courts in making such determinations.
33
 Part 
III details the current modes employed by courts facing questions regarding the informational 
privacy rights of minors and what levels of scrutiny are currently being utilized.
34
 Finally, Part 
IV argues for the application of heightened scrutiny to any law infringing on a minor’s right to 
informational privacy in the context of health care information.
35
 
                                                        
28
 See David R. Katner, Confidentiality and Juvenile Mental Health Records in Dependency Proceedings, 12 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 525 (2004) (“Unlike most medical problems, the social stigma of mental health problems 
creates a barrier against patients seeking out treatment.”). 
29
 See id. at 526 (“The impact of this stigmatization associated with mental health problems may be even greater on 
children: ‘Twenty percent or less of kids with major depression get treatment,’ says Neal Ryan, a professor of child 
psychiatry at the University of Pittsburgh. Many of the children who are diagnosed are massively undertreated, Ryan 
says, in part because of parents' fears of stigmatizing their children.’”). 
30
 See id. at 526-27 (“A strong argument may be made that mental health records are uniquely different from 
ordinary medical records. Although many medical procedures give rise to privacy concerns, the simple act of 
consulting a mental health specialist, in itself, often creates such a stigma either in the minds of the public, or from 
the perspective of the patient, that special treatment of mental health records should be considered.”). 
31
 See infra Part I. 
32
 See infra Part I. 
33
 See infra Part II. 
34
 See infra Part III. 
35
 See infra Part IV. 
 6 
I. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY: A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT? 
 
Although not an enumerated right within the explicit words of the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has found an implicit right to privacy.
36
 The Court has 
deemed the right to privacy to be a fundamental right, and with that the Court afforded it added 
protections in the form of heightened judicial review.
37
 This right encompasses a variety of 
elements, from the right to sexual autonomy, to the right to medical care decisions.
38
 A relatively 
recent element is the right to informational privacy and the ability of individuals to control 
information about themselves.
39
 Because this is a contemporary component within the right to 
privacy as a whole, the Court struggled with the standard of review that should be applied in 
such cases, ultimately leaving a murky precedent with little direction for lower courts.
40
  
A. The Full Protections of the Constitution: Fundament Rights and Constitutionally Protected 
Liberty Interests 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that some liberties are so important that 
they are deemed to be fundamental rights and that generally the government cannot infringe on 
them unless strict scrutiny is met.
41
 Fundamental rights are those enumerated and unenumerated 
rights recognized to be fundamentally protected by the Constitution.
42
 Constitutionally protected 
liberty interests are similar in that they receive heightened scrutiny; however, in some cases they 
do not receive the same level of protection as fundamental rights.
43
 
                                                        
36
 See infra Section I.A. 
37
 See infra Section I.A. 
38
 See infra Section I.B. 
39
 See infra Section I.C. 
40
 See infra Section I.D. 
41
 See Wolf, supra note 12, at 106 (“ What is generally accepted, however, is that there is such a thing as 
“fundamental rights,” the denial of which must satisfy strict scrutiny in order to pass constitutional muster.”). 
42
 See id. at 102 (“Deciding which asserted “rights” are “fundamental” is no easy task, [as is the]methodological 
framework for “finding” fundamental rights . . . To start, the disparate theories regarding the source of 
unenumerated rights specifically, and of constitutional interpretation generally, make it nearly impossible to arrive at 
one unifying principle for assessing the fundamentality of rights.”). 
43
 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833, 882 (1992) (applying the “undue burden” test to abortion, 
rather than strict scrutiny). 
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Though various methodologies exist in determining whether a right is fundamental, the 
most widely applied framework by the Supreme Court of the United States rests firmly in the 
concept of tradition.
44
 This methodology has been expressed in a variety of tests employed by the 
Court.
45
 One of the earliest incantations was expressed by Justice Cardozo, who noted the states 
were free to regulate “unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”46 Later, Justice Cardozo 
articulated the test somewhat differently, stating that a right was fundamental if it was “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.”47 More recently, the court has blended the various tests and 
stated that the test for whether a right is fundamental is whether the right is “deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”48 
Throughout the course of its fundamental rights jurisprudence, the Court has found 
numerous rights to be fundamental. Obviously those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are 
given the status.
49
 However, it is those rights not explicitly contained within the words of the 
Constitution that the Court has grappled with. In 1923, the Court recognized the fundamental 
right to the upbringing of one’s children through the direction of their education.50 Many years 
later, the Court also held fundamental the right to keep one’s family together.51 In 1942, in 
striking down a mandatory sterilization statute, the Court declared that the right to procreate was 
                                                        
44
 See id.   
45
 See id.  
46
 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
47
 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
48
 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
49
 See generally John R. Vilea, Proposals to Amend the Bill of Rights: Are Fundamental Rights in Jeopardy?, 75 
JUDICATURE 62 (1991). 
50
 See Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). “The American people have always regarded education and 
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted . . . Corresponding 
to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life; 
and nearly all the states, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws.” Id. at 399. 
51
 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977) (“[T]he Constitution prevents East Cleveland from 
standardizing its children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.). 
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a fundamental right deserving of the full protections of the constitution.
52
 The Court also 
declared that the right to use contraception is fundamental,
53
 regardless of marital status.
54
 
In 1966 the Court declared that the right to interstate travel was indeed fundamental.
55
 
The following year, in deciding whether a Virginia statute that essentially prevented marriage 
between people of different races violated the Equal Protection Clause, the court declared that 
“[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and 
survival.”56 The Court has also published one of many opinions expounding the various rights 
associated with voting—though not an absolute right, the Court has found the right to vote free 
of charge
57
 and the right to have one’s vote counted equally,58 among others. 
Other rights, though not given the elevated status of fundamental rights, have been 
deemed to be constitutionally protected liberty interests and thusly afforded similar protection 
under the Constitution. 
59
 One example, perhaps the most controversial in the Court’s history, is 
the right of a woman to obtain an abortion. In Roe v. Wade, the Court did not go so far as to call 
abortion a fundamental right, but rather it referred to it as a liberty interest.
60
 Though the Court 
ultimately held that the right to abortion existed, it did not apply strict scrutiny, the level of 
scrutiny given to fundamental rights.
61
 This case is exemplary of the fact that though some rights 
                                                        
52
 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
53
 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
54
 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (expanding the right to contraception to unmarried persons). 
“We hold that by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated, [the 
statutes] violate the Equal Protection Clause.” Id.  
55
 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). 
56
  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541(1942)). 
57
 See Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that there is a fundamental 
right to vote for free).  
58
 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 564 (1964). 
59
 See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
60
 See id. at 152-54. 
61
 See id. at 154 (“We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that 
this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.”). 
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have not explicitly been given the status of fundamental, the Court has ensured their protection 
by applying varying forms of heightened scrutiny to violations thereof. 
B. Giving Fundamental Rights the Highest Level of Protection: Strict Scrutiny and Beyond  
 
While the determination of fundamental rights is certainly not without controversy, what 
has been virtually universally accepted is that infringements of denials of such rights must meet 
strict scrutiny review.
62 In order to satisfy strict scrutiny review courts must first determine if the 
government has a compelling purpose underlying the particular law.
63
 If the government’s 
purpose is deemed to be compelling, the next inquiry is whether the law is “a narrowly tailored 
means of furthering those governmental interests.”64 Narrow tailoring means that the law is 
neither overinclusive nor underinclusive and is the “least restrictive alternative” available to 
pursue those ends.”65 “This inquiry into “fit” between the ends and the means enables courts to 
test the sincerity of the government's claimed objective.”66 In application, it is virtually 
impossible for a law infringing on a fundamental right to survive this level of judicial 
scrutiny
67—in fact, the last time a law that discriminated on the basis of national origin was 
upheld resulted in the Japanese Internment of World War II.
68
 
                                                        
62
 See Wolf, supra note 33, at 106 (“What is generally accepted, however, is that there is such a thing as 
“fundamental rights,” the denial of which must satisfy strict scrutiny in order to pass constitutional muster.”); see 
also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict 
scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise 
invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty 
of just and equal laws.”); Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“It should be noted, to begin with, that all 
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that 
all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing 
public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”). 
63
 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal 
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006). “Because the government is impinging upon someone's core 
constitutional rights, only the most pressing circumstances can justify the government action.” See id. 
64
 See id. 
65
 See id. at 800-01. 
66
 See id. at 801. 
67
 See id. at 794 (noting the widely accepted belief that the “strict scrutiny standard of review applied to enforce 
rights such as free speech and equal protection is ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”). 
68
 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (“It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a 
citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty 
 10 
Conversely, the Court has employed a varied, hybrid approach when reviewing 
infringements of what it deems to be constitutionally protected liberty interests. Again, abortion 
is a prime example of heightened scrutiny that does not quite rise to the level of strict scrutiny. In 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court held that rather than 
needing to meet strict scrutiny, laws that infringed on the constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in abortion must meet a different standard.
69
 The Court developed what it called the 
“undue burden” test, deeming that only laws that placed an undue burden on a woman’s ability 
to obtain an abortion would be found unconstitutional.
70
 
Consequently, being deemed a fundamental right or constitutionally protected liberty 
interest by the Supreme Court of the United States imbeds a particular right with the highest 
level of protection from the Court. Though many such rights were easily identified by the Court, 
others have developed after years of judicial interpretation and heated debate. The right to 
privacy, and the rights it entails, is a prime example. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and good disposition towards the United States. Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving 
the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. Regardless of the true nature 
of the assembly and relocation centers—and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the 
ugly connotations that term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. To cast this 
case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely 
confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He 
was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities 
feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided 
that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the 
West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military 
leaders—as inevitably it must—determined that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of 
disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was 
short. We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these 
actions were unjustified.”). 
69
 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
70
 See id. (“The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the 
incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate 
it. Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power 
of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”). 
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C. What is the Right to Privacy? 
 
“[The] right of privacy [is] older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, 
older than our school system.”71 Privacy, a fundamental right that encompasses many others, has 
long been accepted as an implicit grant under the Constitution. However, determining the origin 
of this right has not been without controversy.
72
 Though the Court has found the right to exist 
through differing avenues, it ultimately became a well-settled fundamental right.
73
 Eventually, as 
the right was challenged in the modern era, a new subset—informational privacy—emerged.74 
Determining what informational privacy entails and how infringements thereof are to be 
reviewed is extremely challenging given the lack of guidance form the Court.
75
 
1. Constitutional Support: The Ninth Amendment and the Penumbra of the Bill of Rights 
 
Some jurists have argued that the right to privacy, though not an enumerated right, exists 
because of the protections guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment.  The Ninth Amendment states: 
“The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to disparage others 
retained by the people.”76 In short, while there are no actual rights under the Ninth Amendment, 
it is used as a textual justification for the Court to protect unenumerated rights, such as the right 
to privacy. One of the biggest proponents of this view is Justice Douglas.
77
 However, aside from 
the dissenting opinions of Justice Douglas, the Court has often opted to apply a different 
approach to identifying the right to privacy within the Constitution. 
                                                        
71
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
72
 See infra Subsection I.C.1. 
73
 See infra Subsection I.C.1. 
74
 See infra Section I.D. 
75
 See infra Section I.D. 
76
 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
77
 See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233-34 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Osborn v. United States, 
385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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Instead, the Court has repeatedly found the right to privacy to exist in the “penumbra” of 
the Bill of Rights.
78
 This methodology finds the right to privacy to exist because it is derived 
from those rights that are explicitly protected by the Bill of Rights.
79
 It finds that the rights exist 
due to the “the zone of privacy created by [those other] fundamental constitutional guarantees.”80 
The Court has made it clear that regardless of where the right is to be found, the right to 
privacy unequivocally exists.
81
 In Roe v. Wade the court upheld the right to privacy in the 
context of abortion, stating that it exists “whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District 
Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people.”82 Once the 
right was clearly acknowledged, the next issue became determining what it encompassed.
83
 
2. The Rights Encompassed Within the Right to Privacy 
 
Since determining that the right to privacy is implicitly protected by the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has found this fundamental right to encompass numerous other protections.  The 
                                                        
78
 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);  
79
 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85  (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various 
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is 
one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in 
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly 
affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of 
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment . . . The Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
were described in Boyd v. United States, as protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity of a man's 
home and the privacies of life. We recently referred in Mapp v. Ohio, to the Fourth Amendment as creating a ‘right 
to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people.’”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
80
 See id. at 485. 
81
 This finding, however, was not without criticism. For example, in his dissenting opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Black, adamantly argued that no such right could be found within the 
constitution or any precedent. 381 U.S. at 1706 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The Court says it is the right of privacy 
‘created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.’ With all deference, I can find no such general right of 
privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this Court.”) 
In essence, he argued that the court was improperly acting in a legislative capacity by conveniently discovering a 
new right to overturn law it disagreed with. Id.  
82
 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (1973). 
83
 See infra Subsection II.C.2. 
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right to privacy has been employed to protect rights related to family autonomy. For example, in 
1923, the court held that the right of parents to direct the education of their children was a 
“privilege long recognized” in the tradition of the country.84 Years later, in Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, the Court also held that the right to live with one’s family members was a traditional 
right encompassed by privacy.
85
  
Furthermore, the Court has also articulated that the right to privacy is what protects those 
rights related to reproductive health and autonomy. In 1965, the Court held that an implied right 
of privacy exists within the Bill of Rights, and that such a right prohibits a state law preventing 
married couples from using contraception.
86
 Less than a decade later, this holding was expanded 
to included unmarried couples as well.
87
 Moreover, the Court cited the right to privacy as 
governing its landmark decisions regarding abortion.
88
 In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the 
“right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal 
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in 
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a 
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”89  
More recently the Court held that the right to privacy also includes the right to engage in 
                                                        
84
  Myerson v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923). 
85
 431 U.S. 494, 501, 504-05 (1977). 
86
 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (“These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for 
recognition here is a legitimate one. The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy 
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of 
contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a 
maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so 
often applied by this Court, that a ‘governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to 
state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of 
protected freedoms.’ Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs 
of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage 
relationship.”). 
87
 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972). In 1977, the Court also held that a restriction on selling 
contraceptives based on age was also unconstitutional. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, (1977), 
88
 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60 
(1976). 
89
 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
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consenting sexual activity in one’s home, regardless of sexual orientation.90 In 2003, the Court 
applied strict scrutiny and overturned a law preventing consenting adult homosexual persons 
from engaging in homosexual sexual relations in the privacy of their homes.
91
 The court 
explored the history of the right to privacy, ultimately holding that the “petitioners are entitled to 
respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”92 The Court noted that “[a]t the heart of liberty is 
the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life . . . Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these 
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”93 
Finally, the Court has explored whether the right to privacy encompasses rights related to 
medical decisions—in particular the right to refuse medical treatment.94 Though the Court 
declined to expand the right to privacy to be so broad as to include the unrestricted right to refuse 
medical treatment that would lead to the patient’s ultimate death,95 it did acknowledge that 
autonomy in making medical decisions was traditionally protected by the right to privacy.
96
 
Accordingly, the Court has made it clear that the right to privacy encompasses rights 
related to sexual activity, rights related to reproductive health and autonomy, rights related to 
family autonomy, and, potentially, rights related to medical care decisions. However, as the 
jurisprudence developed, the Court noted a distinction among privacy rights in the cases brought 
before it—some involved the right to make certain decisions deemed as private, while others 
                                                        
90
 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
91
 See id. at 564-67, 578. 
92
 Id. at 578 (“Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct 
without intervention of the government. ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty 
which the government may not enter.’ The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”) (internal citations omitted). 
93
 Id. at 574. 
94
 See Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
95
 See id. at 286. 
96
  See id. at 267-77. 
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involved an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal information.
97 In fact, more recently, the 
Court has outright acknowledged the right to privacy of information.
98
 Not surprisingly, this has 
led to varying approaches by the lower courts and a less-than-definitive stance from the Supreme 
Court. 
D. The Right to Informational Privacy 
 
The right to informational privacy, yet another subcategory of the fundamental right to 
privacy, was first articulated in 1977 in Whalen v. Roe.
99
 The Court was presented with the 
question of whether the State of New York could store the names and addresses of persons who 
had obtained particular prescription drugs in a centralized computer.
100
 Although the Court found 
no constitutional violation in this instance, it was the first time the court articulated a right to 
privacy of information
101
 as distinct from the privacy interest in making certain decisions.
102
 The 
Court’s holding explained a concept that was perhaps instinctually known, but never properly 
enunciated—that a basic aspect of privacy is the ability to control information about oneself.103  
                                                        
97
 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (“The cases sometimes characterized as protecting “privacy” 
have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”). 
98
 See id. 
99
 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
100
 Id.  at 591. 
101
 Id. at 605-06 (“Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution, 
nevertheless New York's statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative procedures, evidence a proper 
concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy. We therefore need not, and do not, decide any 
question which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data whether intentional or 
unintentional or by a system that did not contain comparable security provisions. We simply hold that this record 
does not establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
102
 See id. at 598-600 (“The cases sometimes characterized as protecting “privacy” have in fact involved at least two 
different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is 
the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions); see also Caitlin M. Cullitan, Please 
Don't Tell My Mom! A Minor's Right to Informational Privacy, 40 J.L. & Educ. 417 (2011) (“The Court delineated 
two categories of privacy interests: first, founded in Griswold, is the right to make certain decisions; second is the 
interest in avoiding the disclosure of one's private information, coined ‘informational privacy.’”). 
103
 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 (what the Court termed “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters”). 
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That same year, the Court again took on the issue of informational privacy, this time in 
the context of the President of the United States’ rights regarding his presidential papers.104 
Though this case weighed the informational privacy interests against President Nixon’s unique 
expectations as a public figure, ultimately finding no unconstitutional infringement, the Court 
was once again explicit in stating that such a right exists.
105
 
More recently the court has upheld background checks for astronauts and other National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration employees as not violative of the constitutional right to 
informational privacy.
106
 In NASA v. Nelson, the Court was faced with the issue of whether 
background checks for contract employees as required by NASA was a violation of those 
employees’ right to informational privacy.107 The Court explicitly stated that there was indeed a 
constitutional right to informational privacy; however, it was not found to be violated in this 
instance due to the protections and nondisclosure requirements placed on NASA by the Privacy 
Act.
108
 
Though these cases stand for the fact that the right to informational privacy exists, 
because they have failed to find an actual violation, some scholars and jurists doubt that the right 
actually exists.
109
 Others acknowledge its existence, but doubt that the right is truly 
                                                        
104
 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977). 
105
 Id. at 456-57 (“Thus, the Act ‘is a reasonable response to the difficult problem caused by the mingling of 
personal and private documents and conversations in the midst of a vastly greater number of nonprivate documents 
and materials related to government objectives. The processing contemplated by the Act at least as narrowed by 
carefully tailored regulations represents the least intrusive manner in which to provide an adequate level of 
promotion of government interests of overriding importance.’ We agree with the District Court that the Act does not 
unconstitutionally invade appellant's right of privacy.”). 
106
 NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011). 
107
  See id. at 138. 
108
 See id. at 159 (“In light of the protection provided by the Privacy Act's nondisclosure requirement, and because 
the challenged portions of the forms consist of reasonable inquiries in an employment background check, we 
conclude that the Government's inquiries do not violate a constitutional right to informational privacy.”). 
109
 See Cullitan, supra note 102, at 424 n. 48 (“The D.C. Circuit has refused to recognize informational privacy 
rights, arguing that the Supreme Court's discussion of informational privacy should be construed as dicta.”); see also 
Am. Fed'n Gov't Employees v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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fundamental.
110
 Nonetheless, lower courts have proceeded on the belief that the right does exist. 
In fact, every federal circuit court, with the exception of the D.C. circuit court, has recognized 
this right.
111
  
E. The Standard of Review? Analyzing Whether the Right to Informational Privacy Has Been 
Infringed 
 
 Though the Supreme Court and the lower courts have acknowledged the right to 
informational privacy, there has been no declaration that the right is indeed fundamental.
112
 
Because of the uncertainty regarding the status of the right, courts have grappled with what level 
of scrutiny to apply to infringements on the right.
113 Unfortunately, in the three instances the 
Supreme Court has been faced with an informational privacy question, the Court has failed to 
articulate a clear standard.
114 
In Whalen, as the Court first wrestled with informational privacy, it applied what can 
only be termed a “hybrid” approach.115 In examining the law in question, the Court noted that it 
was “manifestly the product of an orderly and rational legislative decision” and not 
“unreasonable.”116 The use of the terms “rational” and unreasonable” suggests that the court was 
                                                        
110
 See Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 
150 (1991) (“The rights deemed fundamental have all stemmed from concepts of autonomy. Although Whalen and 
Nixon both allude to the possible constitutional protection of informational privacy, neither explicitly articulates a 
standard of review or holds that the right to informational privacy is a “fundamental” right.”); see also Skinner-
Thompson, supra note 21, at 177-78  (“The Supreme Court has been squarely confronted with whether there exists a 
constitutional right to informational privacy on three occasions.
 
Each time, the Court has avoided recognizing the 
right. Instead, the Court has assumed for the sake of argument that such a right exists but found no violation under 
the facts of the case presented.”).  
111
 See Cullitan, supra note 102, at 424. 
112
 See Chlapowski, supra note 110, at 150 (discussing how the Court has never expressly stated that information 
privacy is a fundamental right). 
113
 See infra notes 115 to 129 (discussing what, if any, standard the Court has applied in these cases). 
114
 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); 
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011). 
115
 See Skinner-Thompson, supra note 110, at 180. 
116
 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597. 
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applying a rational basis test, the most lenient form of judicial review.
117
 However, the court later 
explored the state’s interest behind the legislation, categorizing it as “vital.”118 This language 
might reasonably be understood to mean that the Court was actually applying some form of 
heightened scrutiny.
119
 Unfortunately, the Court made no mention whatsoever of what standard it 
was applying.
120
 
Given another opportunity that same year, in Nixon, the Court again failed to articulate a 
discernable standard of review when deciding informational privacy issues.
121
 Instead, the Court 
stated that if there is an infringement on informational privacy it “must be weighed against the 
public interest” at stake.122 In finding that the law was not an infringement on the right to 
informational privacy, the Court noted that the law as not “an unreasonable solution.”123 These 
two phases do not point to any discernible level of scrutiny, heightened or otherwise. Instead, the 
methodology employed by the court resembles Fourth Amendment analysis.
124
 Finding no 
guidance from its earlier informational privacy decisions, the hope was that when the Court 
faced the issue again in 2011, it would definitively answer what level of scrutiny is to be applied 
in such cases.
125
 
In NASA v Nelson, decided only a few years ago, the Court was presented with yet 
another opportunity to pronounce the appropriate test for evaluating informational privacy 
                                                        
117
 See Skinner-Thompson, supra note 110, at 180 (“The test applied to determine whether the New York statute 
violated any assumed right to informational privacy was unclear. At times, the Court characterized the law as a 
“rational legislative decision” that was not “unreasonable,” perhaps suggesting that a rational basis test was 
applied.”). 
118
 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598. 
119
 See Skinner-Thompson, supra note 110, at 180. 
120
 See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
121
 See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
122
 Id. at 458. 
123
 Id. at 464-65. 
124
 See Skinner-Thompson, supra note 110, at 181 (“The Court's analysis, therefore, was similar to the traditional 
Fourth Amendment analysis employed when nonprosecutorial government action not amounting to a “search” is at 
issue, or when determining whether a search ought to be exempted from warrant requirement.”). 
125
 See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011). 
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infringements; however, yet again, the opportunity was missed.
126
 Instead of simply stating the 
level of scrutiny to be applied, the Court focused on the “reasonableness” of the questionnaire 
required by the government.
127
 In fact, the Court mentioned the reasonableness of the 
questionnaire ten times in its opinion.
128
 This language and emphasis would seem to suggest a 
rational basis test. Moreover, the Court explicitly rejected any requirement imposing a burden on 
the Government to show that its questionnaires were “necessary.”129 In fact, the Court relied on 
its prior holding in Whalen, to support this position.
130
 Regrettably, this circular argument leaves 
no real guidance as to how to proceed. 
Unfortunately, none of these decisions endeavors to make a distinction between the types 
of information being threatened and the level of scrutiny to be applied. If such an undertaking 
were made, courts might reasonably determine that a lesser form of scrutiny applies to certain, 
less-sensitive information, while heightened or strict scrutiny applies to other information—
specifically, mental health records. Finally, these cases also fail to address whether the right 
applies to minors, and, if so, how it is to be applied. Fortunately, however, some guidance can be 
gleaned for the Supreme Court’s treatment of minors with regard to decisional privacy.131 
                                                        
126
 See id. at 134. 
127
 Id. at 154 (“The reasonableness of such open-ended questions is illustrated by their pervasiveness in the public 
and private sectors.”). 
128
 See, e.g., id. at 750 (The challenged questions on SF–85 and Form 42 are reasonable, employment-related 
inquiries that further the Government's interests in managing its internal operations. SF–85's “treatment or 
counseling” question is a follow-up question to a reasonable inquiry about illegal-drug use. In context, the drug-
treatment inquiry is also a reasonable, employment-related inquiry.”); see also Skinner-Thompson, supra note 110, 
at 183 (“The Court emphasized the reasonableness of the government questionnaire no less than ten times in its 
opinion.”). 
129
 See Nelson, 562 U.S. at 760 (“We reject the argument that the Government, when it requests job-related personal 
information in an employment background check, has a constitutional burden to demonstrate that its questions are 
“necessary” or the least restrictive means of furthering its interests. So exacting a standard runs directly contrary to 
Whalen. The patients in Whalen, much like respondents here, argued that New York's statute was unconstitutional 
because the State could not “demonstrate the necessity” of its program. The Court quickly rejected that argument, 
concluding that New York's collection of patients' prescription information could “not be held unconstitutional 
simply because” a court viewed it as ‘unnecessary, in whole or in part.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
130
 See id. 
131
 See infra Part II. 
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MINORS 
 
 The Supreme Court of the United States has offered some guidance in the protections 
given to minors under the Constitution.
132
 More specifically, the Court has looked at minors’ 
rights in the context of abortion, freedom of speech, the right to counsel and other due process 
rights, among others.
133
 In each of these situations, the Court has held that minors are entitled to 
Constitutional protections; however, in most cases the rights are abridged considerably.
134
 
Unfortunately in all cases heard by the Court, the issue was one of decisional privacy, and not 
informational privacy
135
 
A. Constitutional Protections Afforded to Minors: Decisional Privacy 
 
 The Supreme Court has applied constitutional rights to minors in numerous contexts.
136
 
However, in each of these instances, the Court was primarily concerned with minors’ decisional 
privacy rights as opposed to their informational privacy rights.
137
 Though not necessarily 
indicative of how the court would decide the present issue, the Court’s varying approaches do 
provide some guidance. In some instances of decisional privacy, the Court has held that minors 
are entitled to some, but not all of the same constitutional protections as adults.
138
 In other cases, 
minors’ rights are abridged in a particular context, for example educational establishments.139 
Finally, in limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has applied constitutional protections to 
                                                        
132
 See infra Section II.A. 
133
 See infra Section II.A. Note that there are numerous other cases in which the Court has granted constitutional 
rights to minors. See e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that corporal punishment of children in 
school violated a constitutionally protected liberty interest); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (applying the 
Double Jeopardy Clause to minors); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding that children may not be deprived 
of particular property rights without due process). The cases included in this Note are simply illustrations of a wide 
body of jurisprudence. 
134
 See infra Section II.A. 
135
 See infra Part III. 
136
 See infra Subsections II.A.1-3. 
137
 See infra Subsections II.A.1-3. 
138
 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
139
 See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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minors in precisely the same manner as it does to their adult counterparts.
140
 The following cases 
provide some guidance on the varied rationale employed by the court. 
1. Due Process Rights and the Right to Counsel: In re Gault 
 
In 1967, the Court heard the case of Gerald Francis Gault, a fifteen-year old charged with 
being a delinquent and committed to a state institution for his offenses.
141
 Gault alleged that 
Arizona had denied him his due process rights in the proceedings that had resulted in his 
commitment.
142
 Gault was taken into custody after making prank calls of the “irritatingly 
offensive, adolescent, sex variety.”143  
In confronting whether Gault’s due process rights had been violated, the Court 
specifically addressed the right to counsel,
144
 notice requirements,
145
 Confrontation Clause issues 
and the right to cross-examine.
146
 The Court acknowledged the various arguments made by the 
                                                        
140
 See n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
141
 See id. at 4. 
142
 Id. 
143
 Id. Note that Gault was under probation at that time for an earlier incident in which he was present when a friend 
stole a wallet. See id. At that time, no notice was given to Gault’s parents, who were both at work. See id. at 5. Only 
after searching on their own, did the family learn that Gault was in custody at the Children's Detention Home. See 
id. When they finally tracked their son down, the probation officer at the Home, Officer Flagg, informed them that 
there would be a hearing the next day. See id. On the date of the hearing Officer flag filed a petition with the court 
that was neither served on, nor seen, by the Gaults. See id. 
At the subsequent hearing, the complainant was not present. See id. Moreover, no transcript, recording, 
memorandum, or “record of the substance of the proceedings was prepared.” See id. It appears that during the 
hearing, Gault supposedly stated that he had not made the comments, but had only dialed the number before passing 
the phone to his friend. See id. He was subsequently questioned by the judge who said he “would think about” the 
matter, before remanding Gault back to the Home. See id. at 6. Several days later Gault was released and his parent 
were given a handwritten note from Officer Flagg informing them of another hearing with the judge, set for a few 
days later. See id. (“There is no explanation in the record as to why he was kept in the Detention Home or why he 
was released. At 5 p.m. on the day of Gerald's release, Mrs. Gault received a note signed by Officer Flagg. It was on 
plain paper, not letterhead. Its entire text was as follows: ‘Mrs. Gault: Judge McGHEE has set Monday June 15, 
1964 at 11:00 A.M. as the date and time for further Hearings on Gerald's delinquency ‘/s/ Flagg.’”). 
At the next hearing, again the complainant was not present. See id. at 7. Mrs. Gault requested that she be 
present “so she could see which boy that done the talking, the dirty talking over the phone,” but the judge informed 
her that the complainant’s presence was not required. Id.  In fact, at no time did the judge hear from the complainant 
regarding the matter. See id. At the conclusion of the hearing, Gault was committed to the State Industrial School 
“‘for the period of his minority (that is, until 21), unless sooner discharged by due process of law.’” Id. at 7-8. 
144
 See id. at 34-42. 
145
 See id. at 31-34. 
146
 See id. at 42-58. 
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state, including the protections from disclosure of juvenile proceedings and incarcerations,
147
 the 
benefits of an informal proceeding for minors,
148
 and the argument that the state, as parens 
patriae, could deny the procedural due process to minors that would otherwise be available 
based on the “assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right ‘not to liberty but to custody.’”149 
The Court’s swift and austere response to these arguments speaks for itself: 
Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo 
court . . . Under traditional notions, one would assume that in a case like that of 
Gerald Gault, where the juvenile appears to have a home, a working mother and 
father, and an older brother, the Juvenile Judge would have made a careful inquiry 
and judgment as to the possibility that the boy could be disciplined and dealt with 
at home, despite his previous transgressions . . . The essential difference between 
Gerald's case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards available to adults 
were discarded in Gerald's case. The summary procedure as well as the long 
commitment was possible because Gerald was 15 years of age instead of over 
18.
150
  
 
Accordingly, the Court held that minors—specifically juveniles accused of 
delinquency—have the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right against self-
incrimination, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to notice of the 
                                                        
147
 See id. at 24 (“Beyond this, it is frequently said that juveniles are protected by the process from disclosure of 
their deviational behavior. As the Supreme Court of Arizona phrased it in the present case, the summary procedures 
of Juvenile Courts are sometimes defended by a statement that it is the law's policy ‘to hide youthful errors from the 
full gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past.’ This claim of secrecy, however, is more 
rhetoric than reality. Disclosure of court records is discretionary with the judge in most jurisdictions.”). 
148
 See id. at 25-26 (“Further, it is urged that the juvenile benefits from informal proceedings in the court. The early 
conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of 
the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal advice and admonition, and in which, in extreme 
situations, benevolent and wise institutions of the State provided guidance and help ‘to save him from downward 
career.' Then, as now, goodwill and compassion were admirably prevalent. But recent studies have, with surprising 
unanimity, entered sharp dissent as to the validity of this gentle conception. They suggest that the appearance as well 
as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness—in short, the essentials of due process—may be a more 
impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned.”). 
149
 Id. at 17. “Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of the Juvenile Court process with which 
we deal in this case. A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be 
restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence—and of limited practical meaning—that the 
institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however 
euphemistic the title, a ‘receiving home’ or an ‘industrial school’ for juveniles is an institution of confinement in 
which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes ‘a building with whitewashed walls, 
regimented routine and institutional hours.’ Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and 
classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and ‘delinquents' confined with him for 
anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.” Id. at 27. 
150
 Id. at 28-29 
 23 
charges.
151
 The Court famously noted, “whatever may be their precise impact, neither the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”152 Though this holding has 
been both vehemently criticized
153
 and ardently championed
154
 over the years, forty years later, it 
remains the seminal case in juvenile due process rights. However, the Court has not always been 
so eager to grant such rights to minors. 
2. The First Amendment: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
 
Just two years after Gault was decided, the Court was faced with the task of determining 
minors’ First Amendment rights in the school setting.155 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, the Supreme Court held that students, as citizens of the Unites 
States, are protected by the First Amendment right to free speech; however, the right is limited in 
the educational context.
156
 Famously, the Court noted that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either 
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”157 
                                                        
151
 See id. at 33-34, 36, 47, 55, 56-57. 
152
 Id. at 87. 
153
 See, e.g., See Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal 
Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 76, 76-77 (1984) (“Seventeen years ago, the United States Supreme 
Court held in In re Gault that juveniles accused of being delinquent have a constitutional right to court-assigned 
counsel. In the wake of Gault, many courts and commentators have argued that the Constitution requires counsel for 
children in other types of legal proceedings as well. Indeed, some commentators have even suggested that children 
have a constitutional right to counsel in all cases in which they are directly involved. In this Article, I will appraise 
this call for children's counsel and suggest that the appointment of counsel is not the panacea its proponents believe 
it to be.”); see also Hafen, supra note 22 at 463 (“For the reasons stated in this article, when considering adoption of 
a “children's right” to independently bring suit, courts and legislatures should keep in mind the valid reasons behind 
the presumption of children's legal incapacity and the importance of parental participation in children's decision 
making where there has been no finding of parental unfitness and there is no conflict of interest.”). 
154
 See, e.g., Joanna S. Markman, In Re Gault: A Retrospective in 2007: Is It Working? Can It Work?, 9 BARRY L. 
REV. 123, 141 (2007) (“The principles and guaranteed rights set forth in Gault are essential to a fair determination of 
a child's guilt and a just disposition of a child's conduct . . . Just as it is important to ensure that the right perpetrator 
is punished, it is equally important that the rights set forth in Gault protect an innocent life from destruction by false 
or inflammatory accusations.”).  
155
 For a more in-depth discussion of minors’ First Amendment rights, see KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR 
CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2003). 
156
 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
157
 Id. at 506. 
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 The Court was faced with the question of whether the First Amendment rights of a group 
of students protesting the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands were violated when they 
were suspended for their actions.
158
 In determining that their rights had, in fact been violated, the 
Court outlined the test to be applied when examining minors’ First Amendment rights in the 
“school environment.”159 The Court held that under two circumstances speech was not protected: 
(1) speech that substantially disrupts the school environment
160
 and (2) speech that reasonably 
leads to a forecast of substantial disruption.
161
  
Though the court abridged students’ First Amendment rights in the educational 
context, the Court was clear that it did not take this restriction lightly: 
Students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons' under our Constitution. 
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as 
they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our system, students 
may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State 
chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those 
sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of 
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to 
freedom of expression of their views.
162
 
 
Thus, while the fundamental rights of minors may not always be on equal footing with 
those same rights in adults, the Court must respect that minors begin with the same rights 
of adults, and infringements of these rights must be supported by valid rationale. This 
premise was later utilized when the Court tackled the issue of minors and abortion.
163
 
 
                                                        
158
 See id. at 504. 
159
 Id. at 506 (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are 
available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this 
Court for almost 50 years.”). 
160
 See id. at 514 (“no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred“). 
161
 See id. (“the record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast 
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities”). 
162
 Id. at 511. 
163
 See infra Subsection II.A.3. 
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3. Abortion: Bellotti v. Baird 
 
In 1979, the Court tackled the always-controversial subject of abortion and what rights, if 
any, a minor had to one.
164
 Specifically, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of a 
Massachusetts law requiring parental notice and consent for an unmarried minor seeking an 
abortion in the state.
165
 The statute in question provided for opportunity to seek permission to 
abort via judicial review, if the parents first denied consent.
166
 Notably, the statute subjected 
physicians performing abortions absent parental consent to criminal penalties.
167
 The plaintiffs 
were William Baird, founder and director of Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), Gerald 
Zupnick, M. D., a doctor who performed abortions at Parents Aid, and an unmarried minor who 
was pregnant and wanting to obtaining an abortion without informing her parents.
168
 
The Court, in addressing how constitutional rights are afforded to minors, stated, “A 
child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution.”169 
However, the Court noted that “the status of minors under the law is unique in many respects.”170 
The Court stated that a balancing of the state’s interests, parental interests, and those of the minor 
                                                        
164
 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
165
 See id. at 625. The language of the statute in question read: 
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of both the mother 
and her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the mother] is required. If one or both of the 
mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior 
court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such a hearing will not 
require the appointment of a guardian for the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted 
his or her family, consent by the remaining parent is sufficient. If both parents have died or have 
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other *626 person having duties similar 
to a guardian, or any person who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is sufficient. The 
commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall be 
signed by the proper person or persons and given to the physician performing the abortion who 
shall maintain it in his permanent files. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp.1979). 
166
 See id. 
167
 See id. 
168
 See id. at 626. 
169
 See id. at 633. 
170
 Id. “Viewed together, our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional 
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account 
for children's vulnerability and their needs for ‘concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.’” Id. at 635. 
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“requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special 
needs of parents and children.”171 The Court listed three reasons that justify applying different 
constitutional rights to children: (1) “the peculiar vulnerability of children;” (2) “their inability to 
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner;” and (3) “the importance of the parental 
role in childrearing.”172  
Ultimately, in applying it’s own balancing test between the State’s interests,173 those of 
the parents,
174
 and those of the unmarried pregnant minor,
175
 and utilizing the three reasons set 
forth above, the Court held that the law placed an undue burden on a minor seeking an abortion 
and was thus unconstitutional.
176
 The Court observed that, unlike denying a minor the right to 
marry—which results in a postponement of the decision—denying a pregnant minor the right to 
abort effectively removes the choice altogether.
177
 The Court noted that in this case, the lasting 
                                                        
171
 Id. at 634. 
172
 Id.  
173
 See id. at 635 (“Second, the Court has held that the States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for 
themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences. These rulings 
have been grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often 
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”). 
174
 See id. at 637 (“Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the 
freedoms of minors.”). 
175
 See id. at 639 (“With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by 
these appeals. In § 12S, Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional right of a woman, in 
consultation with her physician, to choose to terminate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, and Doe v. 
Bolton, with the special interest of the State in encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the advice of her 
parents in making the important decision whether or not to bear a child.”) (internal citations omitted). 
176
 See id. at 647-48 (“We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation such as that undertaken by Massachusetts, 
every minor must have the opportunity—if she so desires—to go directly to a court without first consulting or 
notifying her parents. If she satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the 
abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent. If she 
fails to satisfy the court that she is competent to make this decision independently, she must be permitted to show 
that an abortion nevertheless would be in her best interests. If the court is persuaded that it is, the court must 
authorize the abortion. If, however, the court is not persuaded by the minor that she is mature or that the abortion 
would be in her best interests, it may decline to sanction the operation.”). 
177
 See id. at 642 (“The pregnant minor's options are much different from those facing a minor in other situations, 
such as deciding whether to marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of majority is required simply to 
postpone her decision. She and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for later marriage should they 
continue to desire it. A pregnant adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibility of aborting, which 
effectively expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy.”). 
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consequences to the woman in question were not mitigated by her status as a minor.
178
 In fact, 
the consequences could be heightened by the woman’s young age.179 Therefore, the Court held 
that absent some sort of judicial bypass mechanism, whereby the minor can seek leave from the 
court directly and without consent of her parents—who could easily impede the minor’s access to 
the court should they wish to prevent the abortion—such parental notice and consent statutes 
failed the heightened undue burden test applied to abortion.
180
 
It is important to note that not all of the justices agreed with the majority holding. In his 
concurrence, Justice Stevens argued that giving the veto power to a judge—which would have 
violated an adult woman’s right to an abortion in this case—also violated the pregnant minor’s 
constitutional rights.
181
 Justice Stevens relied heavily on the right to privacy in his reasoning, 
ultimately arguing that the judicial hearing bypass mechanism would subject the minor to public 
scrutiny that would be in direct juxtaposition with her right to privacy.
182
  
Moreover, though the Court was primarily concerned with decisional privacy in this case, 
it did foreshadow the issue of informational privacy and recognized that it was one aspect of the 
case.
183
 The court repeatedly noted the importance of confidentiality regarding the decision to 
abort.
184
 Though no explicit acknowledgement was made, the Court hinted at the fact that a 
minor might have a privacy interest not just in the decision, but also in the information regarding 
that decision.
185
 
                                                        
178
 See id. 
179
 See id. (“Indeed, considering her probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional 
maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor.”). 
180
 See id. at 647-48. 
181
 See id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
182
 See id. 
183
 See id. at 631, 645 (majority opinion). 
184
 See id. at 645 (“The proceeding need not be brought in the minor's name and steps may be taken, by 
impoundment or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and her parents.”). 
185
 See id. at 631, 645. 
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Though the Supreme Court has addressed exactly how and to what degree certain privacy 
interests are applied to minors, many questions have been left unanswered. In particular, the 
Court has yet to address the question of informational privacy as applied to minors. Though 
some guidance can be gleaned from landmark decisions such as Gault, Bellotti and Tinker, 
especially in terms of privacy issues involving decision-making abilities, these cases do not 
definitively answer the question of whether the Court would afford full informational privacy 
rights to minors in the context of health care records. Instead, we must look to how lower courts 
have decided the matter more generally. 
III. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AS APPLIED TO MINORS 
 
Though a relatively new inquiry, lower courts have grappled with the issue of the 
informational privacy right of minors.
186
 In weighing these matter courts have split on the issue 
of whether minors should be afforded the same informational privacy rights as adults.
187
 On one 
side, courts have held that in the context of minors, the heightened scrutiny applied to privacy 
issues for adults is inappropriate, and a lesser form of scrutiny is more appropriate.
188
 
Conversely, other courts have held that the informational privacy rights of minors are entitled to 
the same protections as is given to adults.
189
 Unfortunately, most of the cases deal specifically 
with information relating to sexual autonomy and sexual health care, as opposed to answering 
the question more broadly.
190
 Moreover, given the lack of a clear standard of review for adults in 
the same context, it is unclear precisely what treating minors as adults truly means under the 
current law.
191
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 See infra Section III.A. 
187
 See infra Sections III.A-B. 
188
 See infra Section III.A. 
189
 See infra Section III.B 
190
 See infra Sections III.A-B. 
191
 See supra Part III. 
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A. The Tenth Circuit Approach: Minors Have Inferior Informational Privacy Rights 
 
 In 2006, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue left unanswered by the Supreme Court—
whether minors have the same informational privacy rights as adults under the Constitution—in 
Aid for Women v. Foulston.
192
 The case involved a Kansas statute that required doctors, 
educators, and others in similar positions to report to the state whenever they have “‘reason to 
suspect’ injury to a minor resulting from . . . sexual abuse.”193 Because of an opinion issued by 
the Kansas Attorney General deeming any sexual activity by a minor under the age of sixteen as 
“injurious” to them, the statute essentially required the aforementioned professionals to report to 
the state any time they suspected a minor under sixteen of engaging in sexual activity.
194
  
 In deciding the issue, the court acknowledged that minors do possess informational 
privacy rights.
195
 However, the court held that the informational privacy rights were 
“diminished” in this case because of the facts that the infringement affected minors whose rights 
are “not as strong” as adults.196 Ultimately, the court declined to apply strict scrutiny, instead 
opting for a  “different and less rigorous” test.197 The court noted three important factors to be 
weighed: (1) the state’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws, (2) the state’s “strong 
parens patriae interest in protecting the best interests of minors”, and (3) the state’s interest in 
promoting public health, “particularly the health of minors.”198 The court concluded that the 
                                                        
192
 441 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2006). 
193
 Id. at 1106. 
194
 See id. 
195
 See id. at 1116 (“We agree with the district court's initial determination that minors do possess a right to 
informational privacy. That is, the fact that they are minors does not foreclose them from constitutional privacy 
protection . . . This circuit has not yet determined whether the right of informational privacy extends to minors; we 
now conclude that it does.”). 
196
 See id. at 1120 (“Minors' privacy rights in personal sexual activity are not as strong as adults' rights would be. 
Thus, the privacy interests in this case are diminished.”). 
197
 See Mitch Maio, Statute Note, When Two Rights Make A Wrong: How Utah's Mandatory Reporting And Rape 
Crisis Counselor Confidentiality Statutes Combine To Hurt Mature Minors, 8 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 265, 271 n. 46 
(2006). The court instead applied a balancing test. See Aid for Women, 441 F.3d at 1119. 
198
 See id. at 1119. 
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plaintiffs had not adequately proven that “the balance would weigh in their favor,” and vacated 
the lower court’s decision in their favor.199 
 The Tenth Circuit’s analysis and holding is exemplary of the approach taken by courts 
aiming to foreshorten the informational privacy rights of minors. In finding their rights to be 
diminished, the court applies a balancing test with the vestiges of rational basis review and easily 
finds that the state’s interests outweigh those of the minors.200 However, a greater number of 
circuits have found that a minor possesses the same informational privacy rights as their adult 
counterparts.
201
  
B. The Third Circuit: Minors’ Informational Privacy Rights on Equal Footing as Adults 
 
 In 2000, in Gruenke v Seip, the Third Circuit was faced with the issue of whether a high 
school swim coach had violated a student’s informational privacy when her pregnancy was 
disclosed and shared with school officials.
202
 The coach in question, Michael Seip, had made 
unrelenting inquiries as to whether the student was pregnant—ultimately forcing her to disclose 
                                                        
199
 See id. at 1119, 1120. 
200
 See id. at 1119. 
201
 See Helen L. Gilbert, Comment, Minors' Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 
1388-89 (2007) (“Both the Third and Ninth Circuits acknowledge no difference in the informational privacy rights 
of minors and adults; they simply apply their informational privacy jurisprudence to minors with little thought to 
minors' special status. On the other end of the spectrum, the Tenth Circuit treats minors' informational privacy 
claims quite differently than similar claims brought by adults—it holds minors' rights to a less rigorous level of 
scrutiny.”). 
202
 225 F3d 290 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
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her pregnancy.
203
 Seip then discussed the matter with the school guidance counselor, his assistant 
coaches, and a doctor.
204
 
 In analyzing the issue, the court applied no special limitations because Leah was a minor, 
bur rather it analyzed the issue just as it would for an adult.
205
 The court applied a two-part test, 
first asking whether the information fell within the “contours of the recognized right of one to be 
free from disclosure of personal matters”—ultimately finding that it absolutely did.206 Next, the 
court queried whether the students’ informational privacy outweighed the state’s interests in 
seeking disclosure of the information, again finding that the school’s public health concerns were 
outweighed by Leah’s informational privacy interests.207 
 Notably, the Ninth Circuit also makes no distinction in its analysis of informational 
privacy where minor’s rights are at issue.208 Though only a few circuits have actually confronted 
the matter, the majority of them have decided that minors should be treated the same as adducts 
when it comes to informational privacy.
209
 Although certainly not conclusive on the matter, this 
trend among lower courts might be indicative of a potential holding from the Supreme Court of 
                                                        
203
 See id. at 295-96 (“In January of 1997, Michael Seip, the varsity swim coach, began to suspect that Leah was 
pregnant. At swim practice, Seip observed that Leah was often nauseated, made frequent trips to the bathroom, and 
complained about having a low energy level. In addition, Leah's body was “changing rapidly.” In February of 1997, 
Seip asked his assistant swim coach, Kim Kryzan, who also had observed the changes in Leah's behavior and 
physical appearance, to approach Leah to discuss the possibility that Leah was pregnant. Although the exact content 
of this discussion is not clear, Leah refused to volunteer any information; she denied that she was pregnant and 
refused to acknowledge she had had sex with her boyfriend. Shortly after the discussion between Leah and Kim 
Kryzan, Seip approached Leah and attempted to discuss sex and pregnancy with her. When questioned by Seip, 
Leah again emphatically denied that she was pregnant.”). The coach then went so far as to procure a pregnancy text 
for Leah to take. See id. at 296. 
204
 See id. at 302-03; see also Gilbert, supra note 201, at 1389-90 (“The court barely mentions that the plaintiff is a 
minor, and evaluates her claim as it does any other: first, determining that pregnancy status falls within the scope of 
the right to privacy and second, finding that the student's privacy interest outweighs the state's interest in 
disclosure.”). 
205
 See id. at 295-96. 
206
 Id. at 302-03. 
207
 See id. at 303 (“While the preservation of this right must be balanced with factors such as concerns for public 
health in the work environments, Leah's version of the facts satisfies this test.”) (internal citations omitted). 
208
 See, e.g., In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 941 F.2d 
780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Cullitan, supra note 102, at 429 (“the Ninth Circuit also applies a balancing test 
and does not manipulate the test to account for minors”). 
209
 See Cullitan, supra note 102, at 429. 
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the United States. However, it is important to note that all circuits, even those who have applied 
the right broadly to minors, have failed to inquire as to whether minors have unique privacy 
interests, ones that might warrant added protection in the form of strict scrutiny.
210
  
IV. THE SOLUTION 
 
The right to privacy should be afforded to minors; however, limitations on this right are 
warranted under certain circumstances in the case of decisional privacy.
211
 Yet, because 
informational privacy rights do not raise the same concerns as decisional privacy rights, the 
Supreme Court should extend the full protections of the Constitution where such rights are 
concerned.
212
 In fact, given the unique privacy interests of minors, the Court should go even 
farther, and hold that even though it is not applied to cases for adults, strict scrutiny review is 
appropriate in some instances of minors’ informational privacy infringements.213 Even if the 
Court was hesitant to make such a comprehensive finding, one scenario not deserving of a 
limited application of the right to informational privacy is in the context of mental health care 
information.
214
 Infringements of informational privacy in this context pose a twofold danger, as 
harm can result to the minor not just from actual disclosure, but also from mere threat of 
disclosure.
215
 As such, it is deserving of the highest level of protection—strict scrutiny.216 
A. Not All Information Is Created Equal 
With regard to decisional privacy issues pertaining to minors, the Supreme Court has 
never applied a bright-line-rule, stating that minors either possess or do not possess the full 
                                                        
210
 See Cullitan, supra note 102, at 432 (“All three circuits that have analyzed children's informational privacy have 
neglected to address minors' distinct interests in informational privacy. Minors are “affected acutely by the threat of 
disclosure of their personal matters,” as fears of disclosure may prevent them from seeking medical attention or 
expressing themselves.”). 
211
 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). 
212
 See, e.g., See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
213
 See infra Sections IV.A-C. 
214
 See infra Sections IV.A-C. 
215
  See infra Subsection IV.C.2-3. 
216
 See infra Sections IV.B-D. 
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spectrum of constitutional rights. Instead, the Court has embraced a categorical approach, 
“accord[ing] different levels of constitutional protection to the different types of children's 
rights.”217 While the Court has not given minors unlimited discretion and authority in all 
circumstances, it has balanced their interests with those of their parents and the state, and granted 
discretion under limited conditions.
218
 There is a persuasive argument to make for a categorical 
approach—one that applies differening levels of review depending on the type of information 
involved—in the present inquiry.219  
This Note argues that the categorical distinction should be made on the basis of chilling 
conduct.
220
 Where the threat of disclosure alone would deter a minor from engaging in behavior 
not otherwise prohibited by law, an offending law must be subject to strict scrutiny. On the other 
hand, where the harm stems only from disclosure and the threat of such has no effect on the 
minor, then the Court may choose to apply a lesser form of scrutiny.
221
 In the case of laws 
infringing on mental health care information, the mere potential for disclosure is enough to affect 
a minor’s decision regarding whether or not to seek treatment, and they should therefore be 
subject to strict scrutiny.
222
 
1. What Information is Actually Protected? 
 The lower courts have wrestled with the issue of precisely what information is protected 
under informational privacy. The result is split among circuits—however, one interpretation has 
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 See Hafen, supra note 22, at 442. 
218
 See id. (“For instance, the Supreme Court has given no constitutional protection to a child's right to exercise 
unlimited discretion in all situations, unfettered by parental or state involvement in the decisionmaking process; 
however, the Supreme Court has granted children the right to choose in some limited circumstances, such as state 
regulation of abortion;78 and the Supreme Court has given constitutional status to some procedural rights of 
protection.79 This hierarchy of constitutional treatment of children's rights acknowledges that limitations on the 
child's discretion by the parents and the state are required in some circumstances.”). 
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 See Skinner-Thompson, supra note 110, at 204-22. 
220
 See Gilbert, supra note 201, at 1404-05. 
221
 This Note does not seek to answer what that standard would be. 
222
 See infra Subsection IV.B.4. 
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garnered the majority of the circuits’ support. The first group has found information to be 
protected only if it involves a fundamental right or constitutionally protected liberty interest.
223
 
The Sixth Circuit utilizes this approach, holding that informational privacy is to be construed 
narrowly and that “the right to informational privacy will be triggered only when the interest at 
stake relates to ‘those personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.’”224 A second approach—that employed by the Eighth Circuit—has 
found that informational privacy protects both matters pertaining to fundamental rights, as well 
as those concerning “highly personal medical or financial information.”225  
Most other circuits, on the other hand, interpret the right far more broadly.
226
 These 
courts are not concerned with whether the information implicates a fundamental right, but rather, 
whether the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the information at 
issue.
227
 These courts apply a two part-test in determining whether the information is 
protected.
228
 The first part asks whether the individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the information in question.
229
 The second part asks whether the information is personal enough 
to warrant privacy protection.
230
  
Thus, depending on the jurisdiction, certain information may or may not be protected by 
                                                        
223
 See Gilbert, supra note 201, at 1382. 
224
 See Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th 
Cir.1981)). “Unlike many other circuits, this court has narrowly construed the holdings of Whalen and Nixon to 
extend the right to informational privacy only to interests that implicate a fundamental liberty interest.” See id. at 
683–84. In its analysis, the court employs a two-part test. See id. The first step asks whether “the interest at stake 
must implicate either a fundamental right or one implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” See id. The second step 
involves a balancing of  “the government's interest in disseminating the information” “the individual's interest in 
keeping the information private.” See id.  
225
 See Alexander v Peffer, 993 F2d 1348, 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1993). 
226
 See Gilbert, supra note 201, at 1382 (“The other circuits interpret the constitutional right to informational privacy 
more broadly, holding that it protects personal information that need not implicate fundamental liberties.”). 
227
 See id. (“The other circuits interpret the constitutional right to informational privacy more broadly, holding that it 
protects personal information that need not implicate fundamental liberties. These courts first decide if the party 
alleging an invasion of privacy has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information in question.”). 
228
 See, e.g., Fadjo v Coon, 633 F2d 1172, 1175-76 (5th Cir. 1981). 
229
 See id.: see also Gilbert, supra note 201, at 1382. 
230
 See Fadjo, 633 F2d at 1175-76; see also Gilbert, supra note 201, at 1382. 
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the right to informational privacy. Undoubtedly, this discrepancy created by the differing 
approached taken by the circuits is an issue deserving of the Court’s immediate attention. 
However, it must be noted that even in light of the disagreement among courts, every single 
circuit agrees on one thing—that informational privacy does not protect information that is a 
matter of public record.
231
  
Notably, health care information would likely meet the inquiry raised under all of the 
aforementioned approaches. First, under the Sixth Circuit approach, medical decisions—
including mental health care—likely fall within the fundamental right to privacy, as stated by the 
Cruzan Court.
232
 Secondly, under the broader Eighth Circuit Approach, mental health care 
information meets the standard as it implicates both fundamental rights as well as “highly 
personal medical . . . information.”233 Finally, under the broadest approach taken by the majority 
of the circuits, mental health care information absolutely falls within information to which an 
individual has and expectation of privacy.
234
 Medical information, topped perhaps only by sexual 
information, is lauded the most sensitive of personal information.
235
 Therefore, in this situation 
an individual has the highest expectation of privacy.
236
 
B. Categorizing the Infringement Based on “Chilling” Conduct 
Since mental health records most certainly fall within the realm of information meant to 
be protected, the next question then becomes how protected? As noted above, this Note argues 
that the distinction should be based on whether the mere threat of disclosure of information 
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 See Gilbert, supra note 201, at 1382. 
232
 See supra Subsection I.C.2; see also Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 
(1990). 
233
 See Alexander v Peffer, 993 F2d 1348, 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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 See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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 See Alison M. Jean, Note, Personal Health and Medical Information: The Need for More Stringent 
Constitutional Privacy Protection, 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1151, 1151 (2004) (discussing the “extreme sensitivity of 
the information contained in an individual's private medical file”). 
236
 See id. at 1170 (“[A]n individual trusts in the confidentiality of all identifiable medical information when visiting 
a health care provider or pharmacy.”). 
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would chill conduct.
237
 If the information is so sensitive that an individual, particularly a minor, 
would alter their conduct to avoid the creation of such information, then laws allowing for 
disclosure must be subject to strict scrutiny. Mental health care records absolutely meet this 
standard. 
1. Harm from Disclosure Only  
 In certain instances, it is the disclosure of personal information alone that causes the 
minor harm. For example, a minor wishing to keep her financial records private from a potential 
employer
238
 falls within these parameters. The disclosure of these types of information presents a 
singular harm, stemming from the actual disclosure alone.
239
 This is because “there is no 
relationship between disclosure of information and ensuing conduct” in these instances.240 A 
minor would not alter her financial habits simply because of a threat of disclosure at a later job 
application. However, if the information were actually disclosed, harm could come to the minor. 
These cases are not meant to be trivialized. They raise important concerns and should 
likewise receive protection form the Court. However, they are distinct from the next category in 
that the harm stems from only from the violation of informational privacy. The next category of 
information presents a twofold harm that implicates other rights, both fundamental and 
otherwise.
241
 
 2. Harm from Mere Threat of Disclosure 
 Other information, such as medical information, presents another danger—where the 
threat of discourse of such information exists, the minor may alter their conduct accordingly.
242
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 See Gilbert, supra note 201, at 1403. 
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 See, e.g., Walls v City of Petersburg, 895 F2d 188, 194 (4th Cir 1990). 
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 See Gilbert, supra note 201, at 1403. 
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 See id.  
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 See infra Subsection IV.B.3. 
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 Note that in many circumstances disclosure of such information is barred under federal statutes such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and the 
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For example, in the context of abortion, a minor's choice to seek an abortion through a judicial 
bypass proceeding might be affected by the potential for disclosure.
243
 The minor may choose to 
forego the bypass option because of the fear that a record of the proceeding will become 
available to others, including her own parents, in the future. Under such circumstances there will 
be an “unacceptable danger of deterring” the minor from exercising her choice to obtain an 
abortion.
244
 
 It has been proposed that the motivation behind laws where the threat of disclosure alone 
is enough to chill a minor’s conduct is precisely that—an intentional curbing of conduct 
“indirectly through information gathering.”245 Helen Gilberts warns of such dangers: “Overall, 
courts should be wary of limiting minors' general right to informational privacy due to the state's 
ability to regulate minors' conduct, as the link between informational privacy and conduct can be 
quite attenuated and such regulation through information gathering may chill other positive 
behaviors.”246 Seeking mental health care is just the kind of positive behavior that Gilbert warms 
will be affected. 
B. Mental Health Records and the Threat of Disclosure 
 Mental health care records of minors must be given unique and magnified protection. In 
this instance, as described above, the potential harm is twofold. Here, actual disclosure of the 
information may harm the minor in myriad ways, from affecting employment prospects to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). This note is concerned with intrusions that are able to 
circumvent the protections under these laws. One example can be found in state bar applications across the county. 
See, e.g., Kathryn Jones, Comment, Fitness Determinations for Texas Bar Applicants as the Texas Board of Law 
Examiners Continues to Tip-Toe Around the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 325 
(2016). The questions on these applications are carefully worded in order to circumvent the ADA standards that 
would otherwise forbid them. See id.  
243
 See Gilbert, supra note 201, at 1403. 
244
 See Thornburgh v American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 US 747, 767-68 (1986), overruled in 
part on other grounds by Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833, 882 (1992); see also Gilbert, supra note 201, at 
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preventing admission to a state bar.
247
 However, it is the harm stemming from the threat of 
disclosure that makes mental health care records deserving of added protections.
248
  
As noted by the Supreme Court, “an intrusion on that expectation [of privacy] may have 
adverse consequences because it may deter patients from receiving needed medical care.”249 
Numerous studies have shown that minors are especially affected by the threat of disclosure of 
their health care records.
250
 Moreover, this is an area in which minors’ “particular 
vulnerabilities,” to use the language of the Bellotti Court,251 are especially evident. In fact, 
minors are more likely than their adult counterparts to forgo treatment because of privacy 
concerns.
252
 Furthermore, this threat is still harmful—even when treatment is sought—as it 
infects the doctor-patient relationship, making the minor “less likely to reveal sensitive 
information to her health care provider.”253  
Both the primary harm from actual disclosure and the secondary harm caused by threat of 
disclosure elevate the importance of informational privacy in the context of mental health 
records. However, courts thus far have failed to properly consider the latter and acknowledge 
that “even if the actual risk of disclosure is low, the fear of disclosure may change minors' 
behavior for the worse.”254 For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court must provide guidance. 
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Given the real dangers of mental health and the growing suicide rates among minors,
255
 
the need for informational privacy for minors is crucial to ensuring their safety. Absent strict 
scrutiny, laws may infringe on the right informational privacy rights of minors without adequate 
justification from the government. Such laws will then deter minors from seeking mental health 
care—for fear their most private information will become public—resulting in them not 
receiving the care they so desperately need.
256
 The result of applying strict scrutiny will be that 
only the most necessary and narrowly tailored laws will survive and the threat of disclosure form 
unsubstantiated laws will be greatly reduced. 
C. Strict Scrutiny for the Mental Health Information of Minors: An Application 
 Like all proposals, in theory this thesis may be workable, but what about in fact? An 
analysis of a current law infringing on minors’ rights to informational privacy in the context of 
mental healthcare is, therefore, helpful. One such infringement, already noted above, comes from 
state bar admission applications.
257
 
 State bars associations throughout the country often require disclosure of mental health 
care information and this disclosure is typically a requirement for admission.
258
 In fact, over 90% 
of state bar associations currently require disclosure of mental health care information.
259
 This 
requirement is authorized by the National Conference of Bar Examiners.
260
 One example can be 
found in the Michigan Bar Application.
261
 Question 54 asks the following of applicants: 
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a) Have you ever had, been treated or counseled for, or refused treatment or 
counseling for, a mental, emotional, or nervous condition which permanently, 
presently or chronically impairs or distorts your judgment, behavior, capacity to 
recognize reality or ability to cope with ordinary demands of life?  
b) Have you ever had, been treated or counseled for, or refused treatment or 
counseling for, a mental, emotional, or nervous condition which permanently, 
presently or chronically impairs your ability to exercise such responsibilities as 
being candid and truthful, handling funds, meeting deadlines, or otherwise 
representing the interest of others?
262
  
 
The language of the questionnaire would require disclosure of mental health care 
information, regardless of the age at which the treatment was sought.
263
 Again, the harm from 
such questionnaires is twofold. Firstly, an applicant may be denied admission to the bar if, as a 
minor, they sought mental health care treatment. This harm stems from the actual disclosure.
264
 
Secondly, a minor who wishes to become a lawyer later in life, and knowing of the mental health 
disclosure requirements, may not seek help in order to avoid any blemishes on his or her 
application. This harm stems from the simple threat of disclosure.
265
 
If the requirement were challenged and strict scrutiny were the standard of review in 
place, the analysis would be as follows. First, the court would need to determine whether the 
state had a compelling purpose underlying the disclosure.
266
 One can imagine several purposes 
that would qualify as compelling—for example, the purpose of ensuring the competency of 
practicing attorneys in order to safeguard the justice system at large. If the state’s purpose was 
deemed to be compelling, the next question would be whether the requirement was a “narrowly 
tailored to further that interest.”267 It is here that the requirement would likely be struck down 
due to overinclusiveness.
268
 While the interest in protecting the justice system is great, it can 
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hardly be argued that requiring information regarding mental health from minority is necessary. 
The same question, limited to treatment sought in adulthood, would easily respond to the state’s 
interest in safeguarding the system from those who would abuse it. This less restrictive 
alternative would necessarily mean that the requirement is overinclusive.
269
 Therefore, under 
strict scrutiny analysis, bar admission questionnaires seeking mental health information dating 
back to the age of minority would likely be struck down as overinclusive. 
Though this is just a single hypothetical example, the purpose is to show how the 
proposal would be applied in practice. Although in this instance, the requirement would likely be 
struck down, in many other cases one can imagine a compelling government interest and a 
suitably narrowly tailored law that would pass strict scrutiny analysis.
270
 That is to say, this 
proposal does not seek to encourage an absolute ban on seeking information regarding the mental 
health care of minors, but rather it just asks that they be given greater protections so that only 
necessary infringements are allowed. 
D. Counterarguments 
  
The argument that minors’ informational privacy rights should be extended to include 
mental health care information and subjected to strict scrutiny is not without criticism. The first 
and most obvious reaction will be those waiving the slippery slope flag—fearing that this 
extension will inevitably lead to strict scrutiny for all information related to minors.
271
 The next 
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argument, that used by opponents of decisional privacy for minors, is that minors lack capacity 
under the law and, therefore, should not entitled to such constitutional privacy rights.
272
 
However, upon closer examination, neither of these criticisms withstands. 
 1. Where Does it End? Affording Minors Too Many Rights 
  
The most obvious and frequently cited argument against expanding constitutional rights 
to minors is the slippery slope argument.
273
 This argument holds that if strict scrutiny is applied 
to minors’ informational privacy in the context of health care, it necessarily follows that the 
courts will eventually expand the protection to cover all information. While this is not 
necessarily the automatic result, nonetheless, the categorical distinctions outlined above prevents 
that outcome.
274
 By placing health care information on unique footing and detailing its 
worthiness of such protections, there is no danger that courts will interpret a potential Supreme 
Court holding as a directive with regard to all information. By stressing the need for added 
protection only where the threat of disclosure alone could chill otherwise legal conduct,
275
 as in 
the case of mental health records, the Court would make it clear that no such unlimited 
application should be construed.   
 2. What About Capacity? 
 
Throughout history, children have not been considered full persons under the law.
276
 One 
example is found in the notion of capacity. Minors are presumed incapacitated for purposes of 
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contract law, nulling decisions and contracts entered into prior to the age of maturity.
277
 Though 
a seemingly harsh result, the rationale for the presumption is similar to those involving 
constitutional protections for minors. 
The obvious fundamental reason for the presumption of incapacity (and 
consequent minority status of children) is that immature children, which all 
children are at some point, are incapable of exercising reasoned judgment about 
what is best for them. For this reason, parents ordinarily have the responsibility to 
make decisions on their child's behalf. In other words, children do not have the 
capacity to make certain important decisions regarding their own welfare.
278
 
  
This rationale, largely touted for restricting minors’ decisional rights, is likely to be raised in the 
present scenario. However, these concerns that are so central the Court’s analysis of decisional 
privacy rights, have no bearing on informational privacy.  Whether the underlying conduct 
giving rise to the need for informational privacy is constitutional is an entirely separate inquiry—
one that rightfully engages in the discussion of capacity. However, informational privacy is 
wholly distinct from decisional privacy rights.
279
 The right to informational privacy does not 
require or even suggest an analysis of the minor’s capacity.280 Capacity would concern only the 
underlying decisions, and not the protection of the information concerning them. Critics 
concerned with capacity can rest easy, as this concern is wholly encompassed by the Court’s 
review of decisional privacy cases.
281
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In an age when courts continuously grapple with the uncertainty surrounding the 
Constitutional protections afforded to minors, there is a need for clear and absolute direction 
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from the Supreme Court of the United States.
282
 Without such a directive, courts will continue to 
inconsistently apply the right to informational privacy to minors—allowing the right in some 
cases, while holding it does not exists in others.
283
 Because of the extremely sensitive nature of 
the information at issue, and the twofold harm that exists from actual disclosure and threat of 
disclosure,
284
 the Court must apply strict scrutiny review when examining laws that infringe on a 
minor’s right to informational privacy in the context of mental health care information.285 In 
doing so, the Court would address the growing concerns surrounding mental health care 
stigma,
286
 allowing minors to access the care they need without fear of disclosure. 
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